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A  recent  contribution to the literature argues that the present international monetary 
system in many ways operates like the Bretton-Woods system. Asia is the new periphery 
of the system and pursues an export-led development strategy. The members of the new 
periphery peg their currencies to the U.S.  dollar at undervalued exchange rates and 
accumulate  foreign  reserves.  In contrast, the old periphery -  -  consisting of Western 
Europe, Canada and parts of Latin America - - interacts with the centre with flexible 
exchange rates; its aggregate current account has been roughly in balance. As under the 
older system, the United States remains the centre country, pursuing a monetary-policy 
strategy that overlooks the exchange rate. An implication of this argument is the following 
asymmetry hypothesis: under both regimes the United States does not take external factors 
into account in conducting monetary policy while the periphery does take external factors 
into account. We provide results of a test of the asymmetry hypothesis. Then, we present a 
new method for decomposition of the business cycle using a time-varying-coefficient 
technique that allows us to test the relationship between the cycle and macroeconomic 
policies. We apply this technique to five countries for three sub-periods over the 1959 to 
2007 period.   
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1. Introduction 
In a series of provocative articles, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (hereafter 
DFG) argue that the present constellation of global exchange-rate arrangements 
constitutes a revived Bretton-Woods, or Bretton-Woods II, system.
1 As was the situation 
under the earlier Bretton-Woods I system of the 1950s and the 1960s, DFG posit that the 
United States serves the role of asymmetric centre of the system, running balance-of-
payments deficits, providing global (U.S. dollar) liquidity, and absorbing exports from the 
rest of the world. In the earlier Bretton-Woods system, Japan and the countries of Western 
Europe formed a periphery. The periphery maintained undervalued, pegged exchange rates 
and accumulated large amounts of U.S. dollar-denominated reserves in the pursuit of 
export-led growth. In the Bretton-Woods II regime, the countries of Asia, including Japan, 
largely fulfill the role of the periphery.
2 For countries such as China in the new periphery, 
the benefits of undervalued currencies exceed the costs of reserve accumulation. 
Moreover, accumulated reserves can be thought of as collateral held against inflows of 
foreign direct investment. The Bretton-Woods I system lasted for about a quarter of a 
century. DFG have argued that the present system, with its large global imbalances, will 
also be sustainable in the medium term.
3
The idea that the international monetary system has evolved into a Bretton-Woods II 
system has generated two (sometimes-overlapping) strands of critical literature. One group 
of authors has accepted the general validity of the Bretton-Woods metaphor but points to 
substantial differences from the earlier Bretton-Woods system, differences that render the 
current regime structurally unstable.
 
4
                                                 
1 See DFG (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006, 2009).  
 Roubini and Setser (2005), Roubini (2006) and Hunt 
(2008) have argued that the magnitude of the financial flows required to finance U.S. 
current-account deficits will increase at a faster rate than the willingness of the world’s 
central banks to accumulate  dollar reserves, eventuating in a collapse of the system. 
Eichengreen (2007) has pointed-out that, unlike the situation under Bretton-Woods II in 
which the United States has been running current-account deficits and incurring a rapidly-
expanding net foreign debt, the United States registered current-account surpluses through 
most of the period 1954-71 and was a net investor abroad. Eichengreen (2007) has also 
2 In addition to Japan, DFG (2003, p. 5) include China, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan 
in the group comprising the new periphery. 
3 DFG (2004a, 2005) projected that the BW2 system would last for another 8-10 years (from the mid-2000s). 
4 See, for example, Eichengreen (2004, 2007), Frankel (2005), Roubini and Setser (2005), Roubini (2006) 
and Hunt (2008). As Frankel (2005, p.1) put it, “much of their [i.e., DFGs] analysis has been generally 
accepted.”   2 
noted that during the 1950s and 1960s (1) there was no major alternative currency to 
challenge the U.S. dollar as the key-international currency and (2) the European countries 
that formed the periphery constituted a cohesive bloc; under the new regime the dollar 
faces a strong alternative in the euro
5
A second group of authors has challenged some of the key assumptions - - especially 
with regard to the central role of China - - underlying the Bretton-Woods II story.
 and the countries of the Asian periphery tend to act 
in a heterogeneous  fashion.  The factors that differentiate the present system from the 
earlier regime suggest, in Eichengreen’s view, that the present system will not be as long-
lasting as the earlier regime. 
6
Some of the critics of the Bretton-Woods II hypothesis have viewed the financial 
crisis that broke-out in August 2007 as a confirmation of their prediction that the Bretton-
Woods II system would collapse (Hunt, 2008; Sester, 2008). DFG (2009), however, have 
countered that the causes of the crisis were extraneous to the Bretton-Woods II system. In 
the view of DFG (2009, p. 1), “the incentives that drive the Bretton-Woods II system will 
be reinforced by the crisis and, looking forward, participation in the system will expand 
and the life of the system will be expanded.” 
 In 
effect, these authors have denied the validity of the Bretton-Woods metaphor. Goldstein 
and Lardy (2004, 2005) have pointed-out that the DFG hypothesis assumes that inward 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to China contributes to the build-up of a highly-efficient 
capital stock that would otherwise be unattainable in that country because of inefficiencies 
and distortions in the domestic financial system. However,  those two authors have 
pointed-out that foreign investment in China has funded less than five per cent of fixed 
asset investment in that country in recent years - - far too small a share to offset the 
alleged misallocation of investment financed through China’s domestic banking system. 
Roubini (2004), Eichengreen (2004, 2007), Rajan and Subramanian (2004), and Goldstein 
and Lardy (2004, 2005) have argued that DFG underestimated the costs of sterilization in 
China and other Asian economies, especially those associated with financial repression. 
Finally, Goldstein and Lardy (2008) and Truman (2008) have noted that exchange-rate 
policies in many Asian economies, including that of China, have been more flexible than 
assumed by DFG. 
                                                 
5 Frankel (2005) also argued that the existence of the euro helps distinguish Bretton Woods II from Bretton 
Woods I. 
6 See, for example, Roubini (2004), Goldstein and Lardy (2004, 2005, 2008), Rajan and Subramanian (2004) 
and Truman (2008).   3 
This paper critically assesses the debate about the Bretton-Woods II hypothesis. The 
remainder of the paper is structured as follows. To put the present system in context, 
Section 2 briefly outlines key characteristics of the original Bretton-Woods system, circa 
the mid-1940s until its collapse in 1973. Section 3 describes the central features of the 
revived Bretton-Woods system, as put forward by DFG. Section 4 provides empirical 
results that compare the earlier Bretton-Woods regime with the present regime. We report 
two sets of results. First, we present results of an asymmetry test proposed by Giovannini 
(1989) to compare the behavior of the center country (i.e., the United States) and the 
periphery under the earlier Bretton-Woods system with the behavior of the center country 
- - again, the United States - - and the periphery under the revived Bretton-Woods regime. 
Second, we present a new method for decomposition of the business cycle using a time-
varying-coefficient technique that allows us to test the relationship between the cycle and 
macroeconomic policies. We apply this technique to five countries for three sub-periods 
over the years 1959 to 2007: 1959-68, 1969-1997, and 1998-2007.  The 1959-68  sub-
period corresponds to the so-called “heyday” of the original Bretton-Woods system; the 
1969-1997 period corresponds to a period of transition to the revived system; and, the 
1998-2007 period corresponds to the Bretton-Woods II regime. Our method of business-
cycle decomposition allows us to compare the responses of macroeconomic policies to the 
business cycle under the three regimes. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Bretton-Woods I, Revisited 
The system that was agreed at Bretton-Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944 had 
several major objectives, including the following.
7 First, it sought to avoid the exchange-
rate instability of the floating-rate regime of the 1920s, which was seen as having impeded 
external adjustment and the post-World War I  reconstruction of trade and finance.
8
                                                 
7 The architecture of the system was decided before the Bretton Woods conference, in negotiations that 
began in 1942 between UK officials and U.S. officials (Kenen, 1993). The following account is based on 
Yeager (1976), Solomon (1977), Meltzer (1991), Bordo (1993), Kenen (1993), MacKinnon (1993), Cohen 
(2002), and Eichengreen (2008). 
 
Second, it aimed to prevent a repetition of the beggar-thy-neighbor policies that had 
characterized the latter stages of the interwar gold-exchange standard, during which 
8 The interwar period can be divided into three broad exchange-rate regimes: (1) general floating from 1919 
to 1925; (2) the gold exchange standard from 1926 until the early 1930s; and (3) a managed float from the 
early 1930s until 1939 (Bordo, 1993, p. 6). The view that floating exchange rates discourage international 
trade and finance and impede external adjustment gained prominence as a result of Nurske’s report (1944) 
for the League of Nations. Nurske’s view was based mainly on his interpretation of France’s experience with 
flexible exchange rates during the mid-1920s. Nurske’s interpretation of that episode was criticized by 
Friedman (1953).   4 
countries used trade restrictions and competitive currency devaluations to increase trade 
surpluses (or reduce trade deficits) in attempts to reduce domestic unemployment, shifting 
that unemployment to other countries (Solomon, 1977, p. 1; Bordo, 1993, p. 35; Cohen, 
2002, p. 2). Third, it endeavored to provide autonomy for national authorities to pursue 
domestic policies targeted at achieving full employment. Fourth, it sought to attain 
symmetric adjustment between those countries with balance-of-payments surpluses and 
those with balance-of-payments deficits. Fifth, it aimed to achieve symmetric positions 
among national currencies within the international financial regime. 
To help achieve these objectives, a new institution, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), was established and charged with promoting collaboration on international 
monetary issues, facilitating the maintenance of full employment,  maintaining stable 
exchange rates, providing a multilateral payments system  and  eliminating  exchange 
restrictions, and providing financial assistance to members with  balance-of-payments 
deficits, thereby easing external disequilibria (Yeager, 1976, pp. 390-91; Solomon, 1977, 
p. 12; Bordo, 1993, pp. 34-35).
9 Each member of the Fund was required to establish a par 
value for its currency in terms of either gold or the U.S. dollar and to maintain the market 
exchange rate of its currency within one per cent of the declared par value, by intervening 
in the foreign-exchange market by buying and selling the currencies of other countries. 
Instead of the rigid exchange rates of the gold-exchange standard, and the floating rates 
that characterized the mid-1920s, the earlier Bretton-Woods regime featured fixed-but-
adjustable exchange rates. Parities could be changed with Fund approval if a member 
faced a “fundamental disequilibrium” on its external accounts.
10 Moreover, each member 
of the Fund was expected to make its currency convertible for current-account transactions 
(Solomon, 1977, p. 12; Bordo, 1993, p. 35; Kenen, 1993, p. 235).
 Fund members were 
allowed to use controls on capital-account transactions. Controls on the capital account 
permitted some autonomy for the conduct of domestic monetary policies.
11
The system that emerged was considerably different from that which had been 
intended. Instead of a system of equal currencies, the U.S. dollar was the center of the 
  
                                                 
9 The Fund’s Articles of Agreement came into effect at the end of 1945. The Fund’s governing body, the 
Board of Governors, first met in March 1946. 
10 The term “fundamental equilibrium” was never defined. The Fund could not disapprove a change in 
parity, however, if the change was less than ten per cent (Bordo, 1993, p. 35). 
11 A post-war transitional period was provided during which Fund members could circumvent the ban on 
controls over current-account transactions. Countries maintaining controls for more than five years after the 
start of Fund operations - - that is, beyond 1952 - - were expected to consult with the Fund about them 
annually. See Yeager (1976, p. 391) and Bordo (1993, p. 35).   5 
system. The U.S. Treasury, which entered the Bretton-Woods period holding three-fourths 
of the global monetary gold stock (Meltzer, 1991), pegged the price of the dollar at 35 
dollars  per ounce of  gold by freely buying and selling gold  to official bodies. Other 
countries intervened to keep their currencies within one per cent of parity against the 
dollar by buying and selling dollars (Bordo, 1993, pp. 37 and 49). In 1949 a group of 24 
countries devalued their currencies against the dollar; however, exchange-rate adjustments 
among the major currencies became less-frequent over time for the following reasons:
12
1.  Reputation - - the concern that devaluation would result in a decline in national 
prestige. 
  
2.  Speculation - - the concern that an acknowledgement that a change in parity was 
being considered would trigger self-fulfilling capital flows. 
3.  Retaliation - - expectations that other countries would respond to a devaluation 
by a particular country with a devaluation of their own and/or with trade barriers. 
4.  Terms-of-trade effects - - the concern that a devaluation would raise the prices of 
imports and lower the price of exports, resulting in a transfer of resources from 
home consumption to foreign consumption. 
5.  Expenditure reduction - - recognition that the possible inflationary effects of a 
devaluation would require a compression of domestic absorption, with possible 
political costs for the government implementing the devaluation. 
For most of the 1950s and the 1960s, major European countries and Japan used 
capital controls to maintain undervalued real exchange rates against the U.S. dollar in the 
pursuit of export-led growth (Meltzer, 1991, p. 87). In turn, throughout the 1950s and the 
1960s the United States ran balance-of-payments deficits, supplying dollar liquidity to the 
rest of the world.
13
                                                 
12 The following listing is based, in part, on Obstfeld (1993, p. 230). See, also, Meltzer (1991) and Bordo 
(1993). 
 In this connection, a key characteristic of the system was that the 
United States played the role of world banker; specifically, the United States engaged in 
maturity transformation, providing short-term liquidity services (i.e., borrowing short-
term) and supplying fixed direct investment (i.e., lending long-term) to the rest of the 
world (Despres, Kindleberger and Salant, 1966). Convertibility on current transactions of 
13 However, from 1959 until 1971, the United States ran current-account surpluses. The absolute size of the 
surpluses began to decline in 1964. See Bordo (1993).   6 
major European currencies was not put in place until the end of 1958; the Japanese yen 
did not become convertible on current account until 1964. 
The years 1959 to 1967  are  sometimes  identified  as the heyday of the Bretton-
Woods I system (Meltzer, 1991; Bordo, 1993; Cohen, 2002). As mentioned, the year 1959 
marked the return to convertibility of European currencies. In addition, that year seemed 
to mark the turning point from a global dollar shortage to a global dollar glut.
14
The identification of 1967 as the end-year of the heyday of the Bretton-Woods I 
regime reflects two important events that took place the following year. First, a run on 
sterling and the dollar into gold brought a collapse of the gold-pool agreement in March 
1968. Created in 1961 by eight major countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to stabilize the U.S. 
dollar price of gold (at $35 an ounce) on the London market (the main trading center for 
gold), the gold pool became a key  pillar of the Bretton-Woods I regime.
 Prior to 
1958, less than ten per cent of cumulative U.S. balance-of-payments deficits since the end 
of World War II had been financed through U.S. gold sales as European governments 
were keen on accumulating dollar reserves (Cohen, 2002, p. 6). After 1958, European 
governments attempted to limit dollar holdings, converting those holdings into gold; from 
1959 until 1968 almost two-thirds of the U.S. cumulative balance-of-payments deficits 
were financed from U.S.  gold reserves (Cohen, 2002,  p.6). Throughout the 1960s, 
successive  U.S. Administrations sustained and/or strengthened controls on trade and 
capital transaction to reduce the U.S. balance-of-payments deficits and stem the outflow of 
gold (Meltzer, 1991, pp. 58-63; Bordo, 1993, pp. 58-59). 
15
                                                 
14 The transformation from a dollar shortage to a dollar glut underlined the so-called Triffen dilemma. See 
Triffen (1957). 
  With the 
abandonment of the gold pool, the price of gold for official transactions remained at $35 
per ounce but the members of the gold pool did not attempt to control the price of gold in 
private transactions; in order to prevent arbitrage, central banks agreed not to sell in the 
gold market (Meltzer, 1991, p. 63). Second, in March 1968 the Federal Reserve removed 
the 25-per-cent gold backing requirement against the issuance of Federal Reserve notes. 
As Bordo (1993, pp. 70-72) argued, “the key effect of these [two] arrangements was that 
gold was demonetized at the margin… In effect, the world switched to a de facto dollar 
15 See Yeager (1976, pp. 425-27) and Eichengreen ( 2007, Chapter 2).   7 
standard.”
16
The Bretton-Woods I system continued to operate until early 1973, but the years 
1969 through 1973 were marked by a huge and unsustainable expansion in U.S. dollar-
denominated global liquidity (see Section 4, below), several foreign-exchange crises, and 
ad hoc arrangements aimed at sustaining the system.
  Additionally, the Federal Reserve’s removal of the gold-backing of the notes 
completed  a transition, encompassing several decades, to a pure fiat domestic money 
standard. 
17
3. Bretton-Woods Revived 
 In light of (1) the relatively-short 
duration of the Bretton-Woods I regime, (2) the fact that even during its heyday it was 
sustained by a series of controls on current-account and capital-account transactions by 
successive U.S. administrations, and (3) its propensity to generate unsustainable increases 
in U.S. dollar liquidity, it is surprising that recent work by DFG offers such a sympathetic 
treatment of the earlier regime. The next section considers DFG’s thesis.  
Two factors form the main backdrop to the Bretton-Woods II story. First, during the 
period 2002 to 2007 a large accumulation of global reserves took place.
18
                                                 
16 Similarly, Yeager (1976, p. 575) argued that “with convertibility at an end, the world was on a de facto 
dollar standard rather than a genuine gold-exchange standard.” 
 While global 
reserves rose by about 50 per cent between 1998 and 2002, they rose by 120 per cent 
between 2002 and 2007. Moreover, reserve accumulation during the latter period was 
underpinned mainly by Asian emerging market economies.  Underlying the reserve 
accumulation were the following drivers: (1) export-led growth strategies, especially on 
the part of Asian emerging market economies, supported by undervalued exchange rates 
and controls on capital flows; (2) an excess of domestic savings over domestic investment 
in many Asian emerging market economies, combined with underdeveloped domestic 
financial systems in those economies; and, (3) unilateral self-insurance (in the form of 
precautionary reserve holdings) in the aftermath of the series of exchange-rate crises, 
especially the Asian crisis of 1997-98, that struck emerging market economies in the mid- 
and late-1990s. 
17 The crisis involving major currencies included the attacks against the French franc in 1969 and the U.S. 
dollar in 1971. The ad hoc arrangements included the August 1971 decision by the Nixon Administration to 
suspend the convertibility of the U.S. dollar into gold and other reserve assets and the Smithsonian 
Agreement of December 1971, which included, among other things, devaluations of the U.S. dollar against 
gold and major currencies. See Bordo (1993). 
18 Unless otherwise noted, reserves are net of gold, SDR holdings and reserve positions in the Fund. The 
data in the text are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.    8 
Second, the large accumulation of reserves was used mainly to finance growing U.S. 
current account deficits.
19
The basic DFG story runs as follows. During the late 1980s/early 1990s, with the fall 
of the planned economies, hundreds of millions of unemployed workers joined the world’s 
market economies. This situation created an excess supply of labor, that  should have 
driven global interest rates upward.
 All other factors held the same, the deficits should have become 
increasingly difficult to finance as the net international investment position of the United 
States declined. With investors becoming increasingly reluctant to invest in U.S.-dollar-
denominated financial instruments, yields and spreads on those instruments would have 
been expected to rise. In fact, however, nominal yields and spreads on dollar-denominated 
instruments fell during the period 1999 through the mid-2000s  (DFG, 2006). What 
accounts for this circumstance? DFG argued that, after the collapse of Bretton-Woods I, 
the structure of the international monetary system came “full circle to its essential Bretton-
Woods era form”, allowing the U.S. current account deficits to be financed while both 
nominal interest rates and interest-rate spreads on U.S. financial instruments fell (DFG, 
2003, p. 2).  
20
To absorb the excess labor supply, emerging Asian economies followed export-led 
growth strategies, similar to the strategies followed by European countries and Japan 
under the Bretton-Woods I regime. In turn, rapid growth in Asia contributed to high oil 
prices, leading to high saving rates in oil-producing countries (mainly in the Middle East). 
In this connection, DFG (2005, p. 3) pointed-out that, between 1999 and 2004, almost all 
of the increase in saving rates in the Asian and Middle-Eastern regions was matched by a 
fall in the saving rate of the United States. Moreover, almost all of the increase in the 
dollar value of saving in emerging Asia and the Middle East was placed in dollar-
denominated international reserves, reflecting both growth strategies aimed at maintaining 
 However, these workers were, in the aggregate, large 
net savers. An enormous increase in saving occurred in emerging Asian economies. Based 
on this circumstance - - that is, a huge increase in the supply of labor that came with an 
enormous rise in saving - - DFG posited that the global economy did not face a problem of 
excess saving. Instead, the global economy faced a problem of an excess supply of labor. 
                                                 
19 As a percentage of GDP, the U.S. current-account deficit rose steadily from about 3 per cent in 1999 to 6 
per cent in 2006; it then fell to 5.3 and 4.6 per cent in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Source, IMF World 
Economic Outlook (2009). 
20 All other factors held the same, a rise in the supply of labor increases the marginal productivity of capital, 
causing real interest rates to rise.   9 
undervalued currencies the underdeveloped state of domestic financial systems in those 
regions, and the deep and broad U.S. financial system. 
DFG (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005) have argued that the emerging Asian economies 
form a new periphery. They also have argued that, for countries in the periphery, the 
benefits of stable, undervalued currencies exceed the costs of reserve accumulation. China, 
for example, relies on export-led-growth to absorb hundreds of millions workers from its 
agricultural sector to its industrial-traded-goods sector. Reserve accumulation by Asian 
and other central banks allowed the United States to rely on domestic demand to underpin 
its growth and finance its current-account deficits. DFG have also argued that the old 
periphery  -  -  consisting of Western Europe, Canada and parts of Latin America -  - 
interacts with the centre with flexible exchange rates; its aggregate current account has 
been roughly in balance. As under the earlier system, the United States remains the centre 
country, pursuing a monetary-policy strategy that overlooks the exchange rate. 
Two other points about the DFG hypothesis are important to mention. First, DFG 
(2004c) argued that reserve accumulation by China and other emerging-market economies 
can be thought of as collateral held against the stock of FDI in those economies. In this 
total-return-swap, China gets the return on dollar-denominated financial instruments 
(mainly, U.S. Treasury securities) and foreign investors get the return on equity. Thus, as 
under  Bretton-Woods  I the United States engages in maturity transformation. Second, 
DFG (2009) argued that global financial crisis that erupted in August 2007 was not caused 
by the global current-account imbalances since the crisis did not entail a sudden stop of 
capital flows to the United States, which would have led to a large depreciation of the U.S. 
dollar. To the contrary, the U.S. dollar appreciated against most major currencies during 
the crisis. In their view, “the crisis was caused by ineffective supervision and regulation of 
financial markets in the U.S. and other industrial countries” DFG, 2009, p. 3). 
Consequently, DFG (2009) argued that the Bretton-Woods analogy continues to define the 
international monetary system. 
In sum, DFG identified a number of similarities between the international monetary 
system of the 1950s and 1960s and the system that has operated in recent years. (1) As 
was the case under the Bretton-Woods I regime, the present system is comprised of a 
center country and a group of countries constituting a periphery. The center country has 
been the United States in both regimes. (2)  Under both systems, there is asymmetric 
behavior, with the U.S. ignoring external factors in setting interest rates, and the periphery   10 
largely following the fixed-rate rules-of-the game. (3) Under both regimes, the periphery 
follows an export-led growth strategy based on undervalued currencies, pegged against the 
U.S. dollar  and supported by controls on capital flows. (4) Under both regimes, the 
undervalued currencies give rise to a massive accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves 
mainly in the form of low-yielding U.S.-dollar-denominated financial instruments. (5) 
Under both systems, the United States provides the main export market for the periphery, 
underpinning the periphery’s export-led growth strategy. (6) As was the situation in the 
earlier regime, in the new regime the United States serves as world banker, providing 
financial-intermediation services for the rest of the world. (7) As was the case with the 
Bretton-Woods I system, the present system will prove to be transitory but sustainable and 
metamorphic. At some point in time, “there will be… another wave of countries, as India 
is now doing, ready to graduate to the periphery” (DFG, 2004, p. 308).
21
4. Empirical Results 
 
In what follows, the results of two sets of empirical procedures are presented. First, 
we perform an asymmetry test to compare the behavior of the centre country and the 
periphery under the earlier and the revived Bretton-Woods systems. Second, to carry this 
comparison further, we propose and apply a new method of decomposition of the business 
cycle that allows us to infer the relationship, if any, between the cycle and macroeconomic 
policies. 
4.1 An asymmetry test 
The United States registered official-settlements balance-of-payments deficits every 
year from 1958 until the end of the Bretton-Woods system, with the exception of the years 
1968 and 1969 (Bordo, 1993, p. 55). These deficits arose because U.S. net capital 
outflows exceeded the U.S. current-account surpluses.
22
                                                 
21 As noted above, DFG predicted that the present version of the Bretton-Woods system would last some ten 
years from the mid-2000s. 
 The persistent U.S. balance-of-
payment deficits were perceived to be a reflection of what was called “the adjustment 
problem” (Bordo, 1993). Specifically, as the reserve-currency country, the United States 
financed its balance-of-payments deficits by issuing U.S. dollars liabilities to the rest of 
the world, negating the need to take domestic policy adjustment (Meltzer, 1991, pp. 63-65; 
22 As mentioned above, the United States ran current-account surpluses each year from 1959 to 1971.   11 
Bordo, 1993, pp. 55-60).
23
Giovannini (1989) proposed a test of the asymmetry hypothesis for the earlier 
Bretton-Woods regime. In what follows, we apply that test as a gauge for comparing the 
behavior of the center country, the United States, and the countries at the periphery under 
both the Bretton-Woods I and II regimes. Giovannini (1989) estimated regressions of a 
proxy for internal balance on a measure of external balance using data from the earlier 
Bretton-Woods regime. His sample consisted of four countries - - France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. He assumed that the domestic target variable was 
the domestic money-market interest rate while the external target variable was the change 
in foreign exchange reserves divided by the level of high-powered money. Giovannini 
used quarterly data over the period 1962:Q2-1971:Q4 for France, Germany, and the 
United States; for the United Kingdom, he used quarterly data over the period 1964:Q2-
1971:Q4.
 An implication of this situation is that the earlier Bretton-
Woods regime was an asymmetric system, under which the United States was free to 
pursue domestic objectives while countries at the periphery gave up their domestic target 
to achieve stability of foreign-reserve flows (Giovannini, 1989, p. 24). 
24
Giovannini’s results are reproduced in Panel A of Table 1.
 The explanatory variable (i.e., the change in foreign-exchange reserves divided 
by high-powered money) was entered in the regressions as an eight-quarter distributed lag. 
The basic idea underlying the test proposed by Giovannini runs as follows. If the United 
States was concerned about only internal balance, leaving the countries at the periphery to 
worry about external adjustment, under the asymmetry hypothesis the sum of the 
coefficients of the lags for external balance in the regression for the United States should 
not be significantly different from zero. For countries at the periphery, seeking to achieve 
stability of foreign-reserve flows, the sum of coefficients should be negative and 
significantly different from zero under the asymmetry hypothesis. 
25
                                                 
23 The Federal Reserve routinely sterilized dollar outflows so that the outflows did not affect the U.S. money 
stock (Bordo, 1993, p. 56). 
 His basic finding was 
that both the United States and the United Kingdom took external balance into account in 
setting interest rates, but France and Germany did not do so. These results are inconsistent 
24 The author did not provide an explanation for the difference in estimation periods. 
25 Giovannini (1989) did not provide information on the sums of coefficients. He reported only sample 
periods, R
2’s, and the p-values of F-tests.   12 
with both the asymmetry hypothesis and with the findings contained in other work on 
policy-setting under the earlier Bretton-Woods system.
26
Giovannini’s estimation procedure contains at least two important problems. First, 
his sample period does not correspond to “heyday” period. It begins in 1962, not in 1959 
when the major European currencies became convertible, and extends beyond 1968, the 
year in which the gold- pool agreement collapsed and the United States removed the gold 
backing requirement on Federal Reserve notes. Second, Giovennini’s data for 
international reserves, taken from the International  Financial Statistics (IFS), exclude 
gold. The use of reserves excluding gold may be appropriate for analysis of the post-
Bretton-Woods era, but it is not appropriate under Bretton-Woods  during which gold 
movements played a key role in reserve flows among countries. 
 
To deal with the above problems, we re-estimated Giovannini’s regressions for his 
sample of four countries over the period 1959:Q2 to 1968:Q4, using total reserves (i.e., 
including gold).
27 We also included Japan in the sample of countries. Since that country 
implemented current-account convertibility in 1964, we used that year as the first year of 
our sample. However, this procedure left us with only 11 degrees of freedom
28
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 1. As would be expected under an 
asymmetric regime, for France, Germany, and Japan  the sum of coefficients on the 
external balance variable is negative; moreover, in each case the sum is significant (at 
least at the 10  per cent level).
. Therefore, 
we extended the sample period to run through 1972:Q4 for Japan.  
29
                                                 
26  In commenting on Giovannini’s results, Eichengreen (1989, p. 45) stated that “these results are 
perplexing.” Bordo and Eichengreen (2009) found that the Federal Reserve did not take external factors into 
account in conducting monetary policy in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
  As would also be expected under the asymmetry 
hypothesis, for the United States,  the sum of the coefficients on the external balance 
variable is not significant, suggesting that the United States did not take external balance 
into account in setting interest rates. For the United Kingdom, the sum of the coefficients 
on the external-balance variable is negative but insignificant. This finding is consistent 
with the role of the pound sterling as the second key international currency during the 
1960s. 
27 Using reserves minus gold, and Giovannini’s sample period, we were able to replicate his results. For 
example, for the United States we obtained an R
2 of .55, compared with the .52 obtained by Giovannini, and 
a significance level (F-test) of .000, the same as that obtained by Giovannini. 
28 That is, twenty quarterly data points minus the constant term and eight lags. 
29 Extension of the sample period to 1972:Q4 produced a negative and significant sum of coefficients for 
France and a negative but insignificant sum of coefficients for Germany.   13 
To help compare the earlier Bretton-Woods system with the Bretton-Woods  II 
regime, we applied the Giovannini specification to the countries that comprise the center - 
- the United States - - and the periphery - - China, Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, Malaysia 
and Singapore  under the revived Bretton-Woods system.
30  The results for the period 
1998:Q1-2007:Q4 are reported in Panel C of Table 1. As under the Bretton-Woods II 
regime, the results suggest that the United States did not take external balance into account 
in setting interest rates. For the six countries at the periphery, only the regression for 
Korea had a negative and significant (at the 10 per cent level) sum of coefficients on the 
external balance variable. For the remaining five countries,  the sum was either 
insignificant (China, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore) or significant but positive (Hong 
Kong).
31
In sum, the results of the test of the asymmetry hypothesis suggest that the United 
States did not take external factors into account in setting interest rates under both the 
earlier and the revived Bretton Woods systems, supporting that hypothesis. However, the 
results for the countries forming the periphery are not supportive of the asymmetry 
hypothesis under the revived Bretton Woods system. For the earlier system, the results for 
the periphery support the hypothesis. 
 
The above results assume that both the probability of rejecting the asymmetry 
hypothesis when it is true, and the probability of accepting the asymmetry hypothesis 
when it is false, implied by the asymmetry test are very small. These probabilities are not 
small if there is a misspecification of the model on which the test is based. In the next sub-
section we base our model on very general assumptions so that the specification biases 
involved in the model can be negligible. 
4.2  A new trend-cycle decomposition 
In this section we use a new trend-cycle decomposition to compare the behavior of 
the centre country and the periphery under both the earlier and the revived Bretton-Woods 
systems.  The basic aim of this  decomposition is to break up a time series into three 
components - - a trend, a cycle, and an irregular component, as follows:  
                                                 
30 As noted above, DFG also included Taiwan in the periphery. Our data source is the IFS, which does not 
report data (other than reserves) for Taiwan. We use the term “country” loosely to include Hong Kong. 
31 All other sample periods (e.g., 2002:Q1-2007:Q4) yielded similar results - - i.e., negative and significant 
sums of coefficients for Korea and insignificant sums of coefficients for the remaining countries. The 
finding that the sum of coefficients was insignificant may indicate that the countries concerned engaged in 
sterilisation of reserve flows.   14 
 
t t t t v T c x + + =             (1) 
 
where  t x  is the series of interest,  t c  is the business cycle, Tt is the trend and  t v  is the 
irregular component. These components cannot be independent of each other unless they 
are determined by disjoint sets of variables, which is not typically the case. Under the 
assumption that the components of a series are independent of each other, a variety of 
methods for decomposing the series has been proposed, but because of this independence 
a common problem with these methods is that, although they may provide separate 
estimates of the cycle and the trend, they cannot, on their own, give an indication of what 
is influencing the cycle, what may be associated with the cycle, or how the trend interacts 
with the cycle.
32  Additionally, the models used to estimate the components can be 
misspecified. To address these issues, we set-out a new trend extraction method, based on 
the time-varying-coefficient (TVC) methodology.
33
The method we propose is to decompose a series (in our case the logarithm of 
seasonally adjusted real GDP for a country) in the following way; 
  
 
12 ttt x t ββ = +                          (2) 
 
where  1t β  and  2t β  are time-varying coefficients,  t  is a deterministic time trend,  2tt β  = 
t T , and   1t β  =  t c  +  t ν . Thus, the right-hand-side of the equation provides a complete 
explanation of  t x .  The trend model (2) with time-varying intercept and slope can be 
nonlinear. We can parameterize the model by assuming that  1t β  and  2t β  are functions of a 
set of observed variables, which we call coefficient drivers, plus an error term: 
 
1 1 1 tt t z β αε ′ = +                          (3) 
2 2 2 tt t z β αε ′ = +             (4) 
 
where  z′ is a 1xN vector of variables that act as coefficient drivers and which we believe 
may be indicators of, or associated with, the cycle, the trend, the irregular component, and 
changes in the growth rate of  t x ;  1t ε  and  2t ε  are the disturbances that follow stationary 
                                                 
32 See, for example, Enders (2004, pp. 156-238). 
33  The particular methodology is presented in Swamy and Tavlas (2001, 2005, 2007) and Hall, 
Hondroyiannis, Swamy and Tavlas (2009).   15 
autoregressive AR(1) processes.
34 The variables in z partly explain the variations in the 
intercept and slope of the trend in (2).
35
Subtracting the trend from the series leaves the business cycle and the irregular 
component, which are captured by 
  
1t β . We have kept the model for  t T  very general so that 
it can be correctly specified. The equation  t T  =  2tt β  is called “a mixed deterministic and 
stochastic trend  model” because  2 t zt α ′   and  2tt ε   are its deterministic and stochastic 
components, respectively. The variables in z affect both  1t β  and  2t β . These variables and 
the covariance between  1t ε   and  2t ε   capture the pair-wise interactions among the 
components of  t x   in (1). These interactions are typically overlooked in the classical 
decomposition of variables into trend, cyclical, and irregular components.  
We assume that the business cycle is given by 
 
1
1 t i it
iS
t u cz α
∈
= + ∑               (5) 
and the irregular component is given by 
2
11 t i it t
iS
t vz u αε
∈
+ − =∑             (6) 
where the  1 i α  and  it z  are the elements of  1 α  and  t z , respectively. Thus, we can further 
decompose the coefficient  1t β  by breaking the coefficient driver set into two sets S1 and S2 
where S1  consists of all those elements of  t z  which we believe are indicator variables or 
variables that are correlated with the business cycle and S2 consists of all those elements of 
t z  which may indicate irregular events (dummy effects for unusual events or other non-





∈ ∑   and  t u   are the 
deterministic and stochastic components of the mixed deterministic and stochastic model 
for  t c   in (5), respectively. The above models for  t c ,  t T , and  t ν   imply that all the 
components of  t x  are non-stationary and can be affected by policy variables and/or can 
undergo structural shifts.   
                                                 
34  We avoid the assumption that  1t ε   and  2t ε   are random walks because these processes lead to 
unconditionally inadmissible and inconsistent estimators. See Hondroyiannis, Swamy and Tavlas (2009). 
35 This circumstance does not, of course, imply that the trend in GDP is deterministic since the coefficient on 
the trend can vary in each period both systematically with z and randomly.   16 
All the coefficients in (3) and (4) are constant so that they can be estimated and 
standard inference on their significance may be obtained. In addition to the advantages we 
have already pointed out above, we believe that this trend-cycle decomposition based on 
equations (2)-(6) offers a number of advantages compared with the standard alternatives: 
(1) it has a clear structural interpretation; (2) it is flexible, in the sense that we can 
explicitly incorporate effects for events that are clearly not cyclical in nature  without 
overly restricting the functional forms of the models for the cycle, the trend, and the 
irregular component; (3) we may test whether policy actions are pro-(or counter-) cyclical 
increasing (or reducing) the amplitudes and periods of a cycle or for the significance of the 
correlation between policy variables and the cycle; and (4) we may consider the presence 
of structural shifts in the cycle and it should allow a more structural understanding of the 
nature of the economic cycle. Our focus below will be on the correlation between policy 
variables and the cycle. 
Simultaneous estimation of  0t β  and  1t β  leads to that of the components of  t x  
without overly restricting their functional forms  (see equation (2)). In principle, 
simultaneous estimation of the components is superior to their separate or stepwise 
estimation that is highly likely to introduce numerically major inconsistencies. This is a 
key advantage of the model in (2)-(6).      
Swamy, Tavlas, Hall and Hondroyiannis (2008) show the way the TVC model in (2) 
may be estimated subject to the constraints imposed by equations (3) and (4) and then its 
time-varying coefficients decomposed to give  estimates of the parameters of the model 
that are free from specification biases resulting from incorrect functional form, omitted  
variables and measurement error. The key to this decomposition is to use a set of variables 
- - the coefficient drivers - - to explain the time variation in the coefficients. Intuitively, 
coefficient drivers, which should be distinguished from the econometrician’s instrumental 
variables, may be thought of as variables, though not part of the explanatory variables of 
the model, serve two purposes. First, they deal with the correlation between the included 
explanatory variables and their coefficients. Second, the coefficient drivers allow us to 
decompose the coefficients of the TVC model into their respective components.  
4.3 Applications 
We applied the above procedure to quarterly seasonally adjusted log real GDP data 
for five countries - - the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France.   17 
The data source was the International Financial Statistics (IFS).  The estimation period 
was 1959:Q1 to 2007:Q4, although in the case of France estimation began with 1970:Q1 
because of the unavailability of quarterly real GDP data for that country before that date. 
For each  country,  we decomposed the  seasonally adjusted  log of real GDP into two 
components  -  -  a time-varying trend and a  time-varying measure of the cycle, as in 
equation (2) above. In estimating equation (2), we used three coefficient drivers (in 
addition to the constant term) to correspond to policy variables that might be associated 
with the cycle. The coefficient drivers were the following: 
(1)  The log of government consumption-to-GDP ratio. This ratio was de-trended 
using Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
(2)  A measure of the real interest rate: the nominal interest rate -  -  either an 
overnight money market rate, if available (e.g., the Federal Funds rate for the 
United States), or the 3-month t-bill rate -  -  minus the annualised rate of 
inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. 
(3)  The log of the nominal exchange rate. For the United States, the exchange rate 
series was the IMF’s effective exchange rate. For the other countries, the 
exchange rate was the bilateral dollar rate, under the assumption that this was 
the key exchange rate under the earlier Bretton-Woods system. For all 
countries, an increase in the exchange rate represents a nominal appreciation. 
The exchange rate was entered into all equations with a one-period lag.  
These coefficient drivers are included in  1 S of (5). In order to discern whether there 
was a change in the determinants of the cycle between the times of the earlier and revived 
Bretton-Woods regimes, we broke the sample period into three sub-periods: (1) 1959:Q1-
1968:Q4, corresponding to the heyday period of the earlier Bretton-Woods regime; (2) 
1969:Q1-1997:Q4, corresponding to what could be viewed as a transition period; and (3) 
1998:Q1-2007:Q4, corresponding to the revived Bretton-Woods regime.  
Table 2 reports the results for the United States. The following findings  merit 
comment. (1) The only policy variable that was a significant determinant of the cycle in 
each  sub-period  was the de-trended  ratio of government consumption-to-GDP, which 
acted in a counter-cyclical direction (i.e.,  a cyclical expansion was associated with a 
decline in the de-trended ratio of government consumption to GDP). (2) The real interest 
rate was only significant in the third sub-period, during which it was positive, so that a   18 
cyclical expansion was associated with a rise of real interest rates. The implication of this 
result is that the policy response of the Federal Reserve to the business cycle was different 
in the Bretton-Woods II regime compared with the Bretton-Woods I regime. In the 
Bretton-Woods II regime the Fed Reserve raised nominal interest rates by more than the 
expected inflation rate during cyclical expansions. In the earlier Bretton-Woods regime, 
the real interest-rate variable was insignificant. (3) The exchange rate was an insignificant 
determinant of the cycle in all three regimes. 
Tables 3 through 6 present results for Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and 
France, respectively. For Germany, the exchange rate was significant in the second and 
third sub-periods, during which it was pro-cyclical - - the expansionary phase of the cycle 
was associated with an appreciation of the exchange rate (Table 3). This circumstance may 
reflect the large appreciation of both the deutsche mark (second sub-period) and the euro 
(third sub-period)  against the dollar during much of those  sub-periods. Government 
consumption was counter-cyclical and significant in the second sub-period, but pro-
cyclical and significant in the third sub-period. Real interest rates were positive in all three 
sub-periods (i.e.,  real rates rose in the expansionary phase of the cycle),  but were 
significant only in the second and third sub-periods. 
For the United Kingdom (Table 4), the exchange rate was insignificant in all three 
sub-periods. Government consumption was significant only in the first sub-period, during 
which it was counter-cyclical. Real interest rates were significant only during the second 
sub-period, during which they were pro-cyclical (i.e., real interest rate rose during the 
expansionary phase of the cycle). 
As mentioned above, Japan (Table 5) was part of the periphery in the earlier Bretton-
Woods regime and that country comprises  parts  of the periphery in DFG’s revived 
Bretton-Woods regime. The results for Japan (Table 5) provide little  support for the 
hypothesis that the business cycle was associated with similar policies under the earlier 
regime  and  the revived regime. The ratio of government consumption to GDP was 
counter-cyclical in both regimes but significant in only the Bretton-Woods II regime. Real 
interest rates were significant in both regimes but pro-cyclical in the earlier regime and 
counter-cyclical in the latter regime, perhaps reflecting the negative real interest rates in 
Japan in the late-1990s and early-2000s. The exchange rate was insignificant in both 
regimes.   19 
As mentioned, we were able to obtain quarterly real GDP data for France only from 
the beginning of 1970. Accordingly, we estimated regressions for two sub-periods for 
France - - 1970:Q1-1997:Q4 and 1998:Q1-2007:Q4 (Table 6). For both sub-periods, the 
ratio of government consumption to GDP was positive and significant, indicating that 
government consumption was pro-cyclical. Real interest rates were insignificant in the 
second sub-period, indicating that the European Central Bank raised real rates during 
cyclical expansions. The exchange rate was insignificant in both sub-periods. 
With regard to the Bretton-Woods II hypothesis, the above findings do not provide 
support for the view that the nominal effective exchange rate was associated with the 
business cycle under either the Bretton-Woods I or the Bretton-Woods II regimes. For the 
United States, real interest rates were pro-cyclical and significant in the latter regime, but 
were not significant in the former regime. For Japan, a member of the periphery under 
both the earlier and the recent Bretton-Woods regimes, real interest rates were pro-cyclical 
and significant in the earlier regime but counter-cyclical and significant in the Bretton-
Woods II regime. In both regimes, the ratio of government consumption-to-GDP was 
counter-cyclical while the exchange rate was not significantly associated with the cycle.  
5. Concluding Observations 
In light of the above discussion, the following conclusions emerge. 
First, although the earlier Bretton-Woods system operated formally from 1947 until 
1973, the years considered to mark the heyday period were 1959-68, a relatively-short 
duration in terms of the longevity of international monetary regimes. Moreover, the 
heyday period included several currency crisis involving major currencies and a 
succession of restrictive measures on trade flows and capital movements by the United 
States  aimed at reducing that country’s balance-of-payments deficits (Meltzer, 1991; 
Bordo, 1993). Given this set of circumstances, it is surprising that DFG offer such an 
uncritical assessment of the performance and longevity of the earlier regime. 
Second, in terms of the provision of a nominal anchor, perhaps the defining 
characteristic of an international monetary regime, the revived Bretton-Woods system 
resembles the earlier system during the years 1969-73, during which time the international 
monetary regime was on a pure fiat money standard. The years 1969-73 were marked by a 
series of international financial crises and an explosion of global liquidity, leading to the 
collapse of the earlier Bretton-Woods system. Thus, in contrast to those authors who argue   20 
that specific differences  between the earlier and revived  Bretton-Woods regimes may 
imply a short-duration for the latter regime, we suggest that the similarity of monetary 
standards  of  the  regimes may also  imply  an unstable tenure for the revived Bretton-
Woods regime. 
Third, the results of asymmetry tests performed on the key participating countries in 
the earlier and revived Bretton-Woods regimes suggest that (i) the United States did not 
take external balance into account in setting interest rates under either regime, (ii) most 
countries forming the periphery took external factors into account in setting interest rates 
in the earlier system, and (iii) most countries forming the periphery in the revived regime 
did not take external factors into account in setting interest rates. Thus, the results for the 
periphery do not support the view that we have entered a revived Bretton Woods regime; 
the periphery conformed to the asymmetry hypothesis in the earlier regime, but not in the 
revived regime. 
Fourth, we proposed a new method for decomposing economic time series. The 
results of applying that method suggest that, for the United States, France and Germany, 
monetary policy was pro-cyclical during the years comprising the revived Bretton-Woods 
system, in contrast to the situation under the earlier regime. In general, the exchange rate 
and the ratio of government spending-to-GDP do not appear to be clear-cut, systematic 
determinants of the business cycle under either regime. For the United States, the centre in 
both the earlier and revived Bretton-Woods systems, the detrended ratio of government 
consumption-to-GDP was counter-cyclical and significant under both systems and the 
nominal effective exchange rate was insignificant under both systems. However, the real 
interest rate was pro-cyclical and significant in the revived Bretton Woods system but 
insignificant in the earlier system. For Japan, a member of the periphery in both systems, 
there is little evidence that the relationship between policy variables and the business cycle 
was similar under the two systems. Thus, the results of this method are consistent with our 
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